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1. Introduction
Bunge’s position on the ontological status of mathematical objects has been clear from
very early on and has not essentially changed since his first publication on the subject:
mathematical objects do not really exist2. This negative claim is constant throughout his
work and follows directly from his materialist outlook. But as Bunge himself has noticed
many times, negation comes cheap. And one and the same negative claim can be
consistent with many different, incompatible positive theses. Bunge’s positive claims, for
there is more than one, are somewhat more difficult to put together into one coherent
position. Sometimes, Bunge says that mathematical objects formally exist. At other times,
he emphasizes that they are creations of the human brain and thus, exist only in these
brains. Therefore, their mode of existence is a mode of dependency: the existence of
mathematical objects depends upon the existence of brains, human brains in
communities. At other times, Bunge says that mathematical objects are fictions. The goal
of this paper is to explore further the type of existence that characterizes mathematics
according to Bunge and see whether and how these positive views can be put into a
coherent whole.
2. Mathematics as a Science of Structures
Bunge’s most explicit and complete presentation of his views on mathematics are in
volume 7, part I, of his Treatise. (Bunge 1985) I will not systematically go over the basic
elements of his position. (See Marquis (2011) for an overview and a critical
presentation.) I will focus on the relevant components for my presentation to be self-
contained.
Bunge claims that contemporary mathematics is a formal research field. This
means, basically, that its products are the result of a community of specifically trained
individuals who share common methods, techniques, theories and who aims at solving a
well-identifiable class of problems with those methods, techniques and theories and, by
doing so, produce new definitions, theories, proofs, examples, counter-examples and
algorithms according to certain standards of rigor3. Thus, mathematics is a science, but a
1Département de philosophie, Université de Montréal, Canada
Email : Jean-Pierre.Marquis@umontreal.ca
2 It seems that the first implicit expression of this claim came in the first volume of Bunge’s
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science whose objects are constructs or concepts. Since the latter never come isolated,
but in systems, mathematics is the study of conceptual systems (Bunge 1985, p.19).
More precisely, mathematics studies the structure of these conceptual systems.
Thus, and as far as I know this point has never been underlined even by Bunge himself,
Bunge is endorsing a form of structuralism in mathematics. Here is one passage where
Bunge explicitly expresses this view, worth quoting in full:
Historians of mathematics have noted that, until around mid-nineteenth century,
the bulk of mathematical research was concerned with individual constructs,
such as particular figures, equations, functions, or algorithms. From then on,
and particularly since the mid-20th century, mathematics has been conceived as
the study of conceptual systems, such as groups of transformations (or even the
whole category of groups in general), families of functions (or even entire
functional spaces), and topological spaces (such as metric spaces in general).
(Caution: Bourbaki, Bernays and others call ‘structure’ what others, e.g.
Hartnett 1963, call ‘system’. We stick to our convention … that every structure
is the structure of some object: that it is the set of all relations among its
components – the internal structure – plus those among the latter and the
environment or context of the system, which can be empty – the external
structure.) (Bunge 1985, p.19)
These systems take a more precise form in mathematics:
Every mathematical system (“structure”) can be characterized in either of two
ways: (a) as a set equipped with a structure consisting of one or more operations
or functions defined on that set (e.g. Bourbaki 1970); (b) as a collection of
objects together with one or more morphisms relating those objects – i.e. a
category (e.g. Mac Lane 1971). Actually the second concept subsumes and
supersedes the first.) (Bunge 1985, pp.19-20)
At first sight, Bunge seems to be endorsing either a kind of set-theoretical
structuralism or a category-theoretical structuralism, though the foregoing quote suggests
that he favors a category-theoretic point of view. In fact, the choice between them does
not seem to be an issue. Bunge falls back on the current languages of mathematics, his
position being that mathematics is about conceptual systems, no matter the particular
language used. Indeed, Bunge always comes back to conceptual systems and never
develops the set-theoretical or the category-theoretical perspectives. Thus, on the very
next pages of the Treatise, one reads:
A moment ago we stated that mathematics studies conceptual systems
(“structures”). However, this is only a necessary condition: philosophy and the
history of ideas too study conceptual systems, such as cosmologies and
mathematical theories. (Bunge 1985, p.21)
This is an odd claim to make, considering that mathematics studies the structure of
conceptual systems. Does philosophy and the history of ideas study the structure of
conceptual systems as such?
What makes the mathematical study of conceptual systems unique is that (a) it
is purely conceptual (i.e. does not make essential use of any empirical data or
procedures) and it involves, at some point or other, (b) positing or conjecturing
the laws (general patters) satisfied by the members of those conceptual systems,
as well as (c) proving or disproving conclusively some such conjectures (…).
We may then define contemporary pure mathematics as the investigation, by
conceptual (a priori) means, of problems about conceptual systems, or members
of such, with the aim of finding (…) the patterns satisfied by such objects – a
finding justified only by rigorous proof. (Bunge 1985, p.22)
There is no mention of sets or categories in this definition. There is no mention of
mathematical objects. Notice the very last claim: “finding … the patterns satisfied by
such objects”. We are back at structures. Mathematics is the study of the structures of
conceptual systems. It is not entirely clear how mathematics differs from logic according
to this definition. Bunge would probably fall back on sets or categories at this point, since
these particular concepts allows us to move away from pure logic.
Why has Bunge not developed more explicitly a form of structuralism? In
particular, why does Bunge fall back so quickly on mathematical objects? On page 23 of
the same volume, for instance, we read: “The last problem in our agenda in [sic] whether
mathematical objects are discovered or invented.” Shouldn’t Bunge ask whether
structures are discovered or invented? Clearly, Bunge does not want to reify structures.
As we have seen already, they are always structures of systems and systems are
fundamentally made up of objects. That is a basic axiom of his ontology. In the case of
conceptual systems, concepts are the objects. Clearly, a conceptual system is itself a
concept and, thus, we are not really reifying structures. We are still talking about
concepts and constructs. Furthermore, could it be that mathematics is formal, precisely
because it deals with structures or relations as such? Of course, in the end, we will still
have to turn to issues of existence, namely the existence of constructs or concepts. We
would have nonetheless avoided the whole discussion surrounding the status of
mathematical objects.
3. Mathematics as an Art?
Indeed, bringing mathematical objects in the picture suddenly brings contemporary
mathematics closer to art than to science! To wit:
...in our view, mathematics is closer to art than to science as regards its objects
and its relation to the real world, as well as regards the role of truth. (Bunge
2006, p.195)
Mathematics is closer to art than to science from the ontological, epistemological and
semantical perspectives! Logic seems to be saving the day… Mathematics is decidedly a
singular research field. Although the epistemological and the semantical components
would deserve a careful treatment, I will simply ignore them in the present paper. From
now on, only ontology matters.
Ontologically, mathematical objects and “artistic objects” are on the same plane.
Mathematical objects are then ontologically on a par with artistic and
mytholological [sic] creations: they are all fictions. The real number system and
the triangle inequality axiom do not exist really any more than Don Quijote or
Donald Duck. (Bunge 1985, p.38)
We moved from the structure of conceptual systems to mathematical objects and Donald
Duck. Again:
In short, mathematicians, like abstract painters, writers of fantastic literature,
‘abstract’ (or rather uniconic) painters, and creators of animated cartoons, deal
in fictions. To put it into blasphemous terms: ontologically, Donald Duck is the
equal of the most sophisticated nonlinear differential equation, for both exist
exclusively in some minds. (Bunge 2006, p.192)
Donald Duck is not the problem. And it is not a priori ridiculous to compare
Donald Duck to mathematical objects with respect to their ontological status. It is, in fact,
rather fashionable these days and has been for some time. It certainly goes in the right
direction, but one has to travel carefully to avoid certain pitfalls.
Of course, mathematics is not a form of art, despite the foregoing ontological,
epistemological and semantical closeness to art. Bunge gave a list of ten differences
between the two in numerous publications. (See Bunge 1985, pp.39-40, 1997, pp.63-64
and 2006, pp.204-205. In the last publication, the list contains a few more elements.
These were mentioned in the main text of the previous versions. The core of the list has
not changed at all between these publications.) We will not go over the differences
presented by Bunge. Suffice to say that one element, already mentioned, stands out:
Bunge insists on the necessary role of reason through logic in mathematics. Thus, it is
tempting to say that one of the main differences between mathematical objects and
artistic fictions is that whereas both are human creations, products of the imagination, the
former is strictly bound by reason in its creation, developments and justification and the
latter is not. It is this central role of reason that brings mathematics closer to the scientific
territory. Reason is at the core of mathematics. Mathematics must be rational. It is the
only conceptual domain, together with logic, that can be fully and autonomously rational.
Even mathematical existence is bound by reason. Rationality is built-in. This is not to
say, of course, that mathematics is logic. In contrast, artistic fiction does not have to be
and, perhaps, cannot be4 fully and autonomously rational5.
4. Real Fictions and Mathematical Fictions
4 It could certainly be said that art should not try to be. An interesting question is where
philosophy stands in this framework. Philosophy does not have the same conceptual autonomy as
mathematics.
5 This is not to say, of course, that mathematics and art have nothing in common. Historically,
mathematics has been associated to a technè and I, for one, have argued that a large part of
contemporary mathematics should be thought of as a systematic technology. (Marquis 1997,
Marquis 2006) I am here concentrating on the idea that mathematical objects and certain artistic
objects, mostly literary ‘objects’, should be subsumed under the ontological category of fictions.
I want to focus the claim that mathematical objects are fictions. As such, this is
highly ambiguous and could mean many different things6. Do fictions differ from ideal
objects? Abstract objects? Imaginary objects? Does Bunge use the term in a different
sense than, say, Leibniz when the latter talks about the fact that infinitesimals are
fictions? In light of the last paragraph, should Bunge develop a philosophical theory of
logical fictions and say that mathematical objects are logical fictions? This would make
mathematical objects a special kind of fiction. I submit that, in fact, the idea of fiction
does not play a central role in Bunge’s philosophy of mathematics and that it could very
well be dispensed with7.
The use of ‘fiction’ in Bunge’s philosophy has two main purposes and they are, in
my mind, rhetorical. The first one, already mentioned many times, is to point out that
mathematical objects and fictions might very well be only constructs, creations of human
brains. The second one is to fall back on pretense, on our capacity to treat certain
concepts as if they had an autonomous existence, thus explaining the prevalence of
various forms of Platonism among mathematicians.
And in a widely publicized interview, the Princeton professor William Thurston
stated that “Theorems just kind of exist, you know, just like mountains do”. In
our view this is an intelligent mistake. It is a mistake because formal existence
is radically different from material existence: …. But it is intelligent because, as
a matter of fact, the mathematician behaves in many regards as if constructs
existed by themselves. He can do so because mathematical constructs, though
human creations, do not bear the stamp of their creators: they are impersonal or
intersubjective (though not objective). (Bunge 1985, p.111)
Thus, Bunge wants to be able to resolve what seems to him to be a ‘tension’ between two
poles: (1) the fact that mathematics is a creation of human brains and; (2) the fact that so
many mathematicians describe mathematics and its objects as being totally independent
of these human brains. Since everybody is familiar with fiction, at least literary fiction
like stories, novels and plays, and that fictional character seem to typically resolve that
kind of tension – they are undoubtedly created by humans and have a certain kind of
autonomy –, it appears to be a convincing solution. Voilà! End of the story.
Be that as it may, Bunge does not rely on a theory of fiction to clarify the nature
of existence of mathematical constructs. He does say quite a few things about existence
and existence of mathematical constructs. It is surprising that he does not attempt to
derive the desired properties of mathematical constructs from his conception of formal
existence. That would allow him to avoid all reference to fictions, which, in the end, he
6 Already in 1981, before the publication of Bunge’s volume 7 of the Treatise, Roberto Torretti
had already identified three different kinds of mathematical fictionalism. (Torretti 1981) I must
confess that I do not understand his classification and will therefore refrain from using it. His
claim that Bunge’s position might, in the end, be a form of idealism, is, however, not ridiculous.
See also Robert Thomas’ excellent papers on fiction and mathematics. (Thomas 2000 and
Thomas 2002)
7 In this particular regard, Bunge’s position is not very different from what is now called
‘mathematical fictionalism’ in the literature. More about this link or, to be more exact, its
absence, in the next section.
seems unable to avoid for the reasons just mentioned. There seems to be something
wrong with his notion of conceptual existence. Let us see.
5. Modes of Existence
Bunge has always resisted attributing any ontological traction to the existential quantifier
and, in particular, Quine’s approach according to which ‘to be is to be the value of a
bound variable’ in a well-establish scientific theory8. He has steadfastly defended the idea
that existence had to be represented by a specific predicate and, in contrast with a large
literature in contemporary metaphysics, he has also claimed that there are different modes
of existence.
To be real, for Bunge, is to be material or, in other words, it is to be mutable or
changeable. This is his definition of real existence. Bunge used to oppose the latter to
formal existence. However, he has recently introduced five different modes of existence:
real, phenomenal, conceptual, semiotic, and fantastic. (See (Bunge 2016).) Although it
might appear to be a modification of his views, the basic distinction remains between the
first mode and the four remaining modes: only the first mode, real existence, is absolute
and context-independent; the others are relative and context-dependent. Iset aside the
real, the phenomenal and the semiotic and focus on the conceptual and the fantastic.
It is worth recalling Bunge’s definition of a construct, as presented in the third
volume of the Treatise.
Definition: x is a construct if, and only if,
(1) There exists (really) an animal capable of conceiving x;
(2) The animal conceives x as a conceptual system or a member of such.
In other words, a thing is a construct if it can be thought by an animal as a conceptual
system or in a conceptual system. Bunge treats this as if it clarified the notion of formal
existence. As far as I can tell, this is only a definition and says nothing about existence.
A series of remarks is in order. First, the definition is two-dimensional. The notion
of construct depends upon two ontologically perpendicular realms: 1. The realm of really
existing animals and 2. The realm of other constructs.
Second, the definition presupposes distinctions between conceiving, thinking,
feeling, imagining, desiring, etc. It is not clear, at least to me, that what I imagine is not a
construct. If it is not, what is it? Are internal visual images constructs in Bunge’s sense?
Internal musical melodies? The last two do not belong to conceptual systems. Or, do
they? In what sense?
8 The latter criterion is at the source of the vast literature on mathematical fictionalism. (See, for
instance, Field (1980), Field (1989), Balaguer (1998), Yablo (2000), Leng (2009).) Indeed, this
criterion together with the so-called Quine-Putnam indispensability argument, seemed to provide
good reasons for a certain form of Platonism with respect to mathematical objects. In this context,
the claim that mathematics is a fiction is taken to follow from the claim that mathematics, like
fiction, is not literally true, precisely because in both cases, these discourses literally fail to refer.
Bunge has always resisted these Quinian arguments and he also very quickly pushed aside these
fictionalist strategies, which he considers to be forms of nominalism and finds inadequate. Lately,
Quine’s arguments have been criticized and therefore the motivation for this form of
mathematical fictionalism has somewhat shifted. See, for instance, Thomasson 2014.
Third, if it is taken as a definition of formal existence, I am not sure I see what we
can infer from it. Since it is plausible to imagine that as soon as a human being capable of
thinking was alive, that human was capable of conceiving mathematics, can we conclude
that all mathematical concepts came into existence from that moment on? It all depends
what one means by ‘capable of conceiving’ and ‘conceived’. And, of course, no one can
verify that mathematical objects came into existence that way.
Fourth, should we add that there was at least one animal that actually or really
conceived a particular concept, at least once? Is it enough that only one animal can
conceive it? Does it have to be communicated? Or communicable? If so, what does that
presuppose, cognitively, culturally and socially?
Fifth, the animal has to conceive the construct x as a system or part of a system. Is
it possible not to? What would that mean? How is that possible? The notion of an isolated
construct seems to be an oxymoron.
Sixth, what about certain concepts that are part of mathematics but that seem to go
beyond our capacities of conceiving them at a certain time? The history of mathematics is
filled with examples of such constructs: 0, negative numbers, imaginary numbers, non-
Euclidean geometries, higher-dimensional geometries, infinities, both great and small.
For long periods of time, our best minds thought they had good reasons to doubt the
existence/legitimacy of these mathematical objects, even though they were capable of
conceiving them. For most of these objects and constructs, we now have fully developed
theories and very few mathematicians (none?) would nowadays contest the existence of
negative or complex numbers, not to mention quaternions, octonions, p-adic numbers,
etc.
Seventh, what happens when what seemed to be a perfectly good theory turns out
to be inconsistent? Do the constructs of that theory suddenly fail to exist? How does the
discovery of an inconsistency affect formal existence? Do we have to suppose
consistency?
Eight, to be capable of conceiving x, very often one has to master various
cognitive tools, e.g. a written language, certain preliminary concepts y, z, etc. Thus, the
capacity to conceive something might in fact depend on a complex network of concrete
and conceptual technologies. Whence, conceptual existence might depend on much more
than the existence of an animal and its cognitive capacities.
Ninth, one could actually imagine that the (independent) existence of these
concrete and conceptual technologies could play a role in the conviction that the
constructs that one finally conceives have an independent existence, simply because their
existence depends upon a complex network of preexisting concrete and formal entities
whose existence is hard to comprehend by a single animal.
Bunge then gives a specific definition of mathematical existence: if x is a
construct, then x exists mathematically=dfFor some C, C is a set, class or category, such
that (i) x is in C, and (ii) C is specified by an exact and consistent theory. (Bunge 1985,
p.30)
We now have our answer for objects belonging to an inconsistent theory: they do
not exist mathematically9. Bunge now fixes an underlying mathematical ontology, to be
9 Bunge is of course well aware that we cannot prove the consistency of most of our mathematical
theories, in particular set theory and for a foundational categorical theory. Should we conclude
that we simply cannot know that, in the end, our mathematical constructs exist?
(mathematically) is either to be a set, class or a category or be in such an object (in a
coherent fashion). We have moved from the existence of constructs as such to the
existence of mathematical constructs in mathematical theories. These are very different
cases and, from the philosophical point of view, the latter is well understood by
mathematicians. Mathematicians know what they mean when they claim that such and
such exist in such and such theory. There are some debates as to the methods that are
legitimate to establish this existence of some objects and the nature of these debates is
well understood, e.g. infinitely large cardinals for intuitionists and infinitesimals for some
classical mathematicians10. It is, so to speak, an internal affair. Recently, Bunge has
proposed that to exist conceptually means to be a constituent of a conceptual system. (See
Bunge 2016, p.228) What about conceptual systems themselves? I suspect that Bunge’s
answer is the same as the one given in the Treatise: conceptual systems are usually parts
of larger conceptual systems thus they exist whenever the latter is the case. Surely, this
chain must end somewhere: there must be a conceptual system that contains them all.
Bunge says that the latter question “makes no more sense than the question “Where is the
physical universe?”” (Bunge 1985, p.30) The question of an overall mathematical
conceptual system is the question of the foundations of mathematics, which we will leave
aside.
At the end of the day, Bunge falls back on his fictionist stance. Thus, in his most
recent publication, he claims again that “from the fictionist viewpoint, the debate over
constructivity is a storm in a teapot. Indeed, whether or not there is a constructive proof
of a given mathematical object, this is just as fictitious as Zeus or a talking dog.” (Bunge
2016, p.230) Thus, provided that we keep in mind the constraint brought by consistency,
mathematical existence boils down to fantastic existence. According to Bunge, something
exists fantastically if there is a work of fiction that contains or suggests that thing. (Bunge
2016, p.231) Bunge is clear that this type of existence includes music, plastic art, artistic
cinema, as well as mathematics. Indeed, Bunge claims that “mathematicians and
theoretical physicists are professional fantasizers. But their fantasies, unlike those of
Hyeronimus Bosch or Maurits Escher, are bound by reason.” (Bunge 2016, p.232) Is
Bunge being merely provocative here or does he really believe that mathematicians and
theoretical physicists are, to use an image, rational writers?
I claim that Bunge does not need to invoke fictions at all and that, by doing so, he
brings in unnecessary difficulties. Bunge is right that fictions and mathematics are both
abstract artifacts and, as such, have an ontological status that differs from, say, electrons
and trees. Thus, we preserve the basic ontological claim that the existence of
mathematical concepts is a dependent existence. This, of course, is true of all abstract
artifacts. I claim, however, that the type of dependence of mathematical concepts is not
the same as the type of dependence of fictions. Moreover, we do not need the pretense,
the as if, to make sense of their existence and their properties. One only needs to
understand mathematics, how it is learned and how it is done, without any pretense.
6. Doubts about Fictions
10 It is well known that Cantor and Russell resisted the introduction of infinitesimals for purely
ideological reasons, even when they were perfectly acceptable objects in algebra at the time. See
Ehrlich 2006.
There is a huge literature on fictions and their properties which I cannot do justice to in
such a short paper. There is, however, one objection brought forward recently by Amie
Thomasson that hits a soft spot.
When we deal with fictions, we do indeed pretend that certain objects or events
are such and such. As I have indicated, this is one of the reasons Bunge appeals to
fictions and draws a parallel between mathematical objects and fictions. For instance,
when we go to the opera to see a performance of Puccini’s La Bohème, we pretend that
what we see is taking place in Paris around 1830. Of course, we are not committed to the
claim that we actually see Paris on the stage. We pretend that the singer who plays Mimi
dies, etc. We are willing to say that Mimi does die in the opera, although we know that
the singer impersonating her does not. We are not committed to the actual death of the
singer. What this pretense amounts to and how it varies has been analyzed in the
literature and we do not need to go into details for our purposes. If we can pretend that
someone dies on a stage, then we can certainly pretend that the Monster Group exists on
some stage, so to speak. So far, so good.
The objection then goes as follows: when dealing with a fictional discourse, we
know when we pretend and we know when we do not. In other words, we know which
parts of the discourse have to be taken as if they were true and which ones are to be taken
literally, e.g. that Puccini composed La Bohème is literally true, that Mimi dies is not11.
Not knowing how and when to make the difference is a sign of psychopathology. If
mathematical objects are fictions, we should be able to make similar distinctions in this
case too. The fact is, we do not. Here is how Thomasson herself puts the objection:
In the case of works of fiction or children’s games of make-believe, there is a
clear contrast to be drawn between committing oneself to the real content (the
truth about the props) and committing oneself to the literal content: a difference
between being committed to stumps versus bears, words on pages versus deaths
on train tracks. That difference, however, is not obvious for the fictionalist
about disputed ontological entities such a social entities, numbers, events, and
properties. Committing oneself to the vows and paperwork being undertaken
does seem to commit oneself to being married. Similarly, to the extent that it
sounds redundant in English to say “there are five stumps and the number of
stumps is five”, being committed to the first claim does seem to commit one to
the second, and so to there being a number. … But then we cannot (…) take the
latter claims, explicitly about numbers or propositions, to be merely pretending
while the former are committing. (Thomasson 2014, p.190)
In other words, in the case of natural numbers, the Monster Group, the homotopy type of
the 3-sphere, is there a difference between the pretense and some underlying, literally
true discourse? When I read about the Monster Group, I don’t say to myself “I know that
there is no such thing as the Monster Group, there is only these marks on paper. But the
story (theory) says that such and such is true and I am willing to pretend that it is true,
although I know that it is not.” In fact, Bunge is suggesting that most mathematicians, at
least those like Thurston, are pretending, but are not aware of the pretense. In the
11 Of course, that is one of the reasons why art is so powerful: even though we know that it is all a
pretense, wefeel emotions just as strongly as when it is real. Some people simply cannot watch
horror movies, although they know they are watching movies, i.e. fictions.
foregoing quote, Bunge says that mathematicians behave as if mathematical objects
existed by themselves. Thus, Bunge explains mathematicians’ behavior by attributing
them an attitude towards the objects of their thought. Is this some sort of anthropological
explanation? We study how mathematicians behave and the best explanation we come up
with is that they pretend that what they talk about really exist. When we question them,
they are not aware of this pretense. Notice that Thurston did not say “I know that
mathematical objects are not like mountains, but I pretend they are. It allows me to do
beautiful mathematics.” However, he did say “kind of exist like mountains”, indicating
that he is well aware that there is a difference between the two, an obvious difference.
There is an additional puzzle. There are mathematicians who claim that
mathematical objects are constructed and mental entities. They might even accept the
claim that mathematical objects are fictions. However, I suspect that they would resist the
statement that we thus pretend that they exist autonomously and can therefore be treated
like any ordinary or real objects, that is ordinary classical logic can be used without
restrictions. Imagine asking an intuitionist: why can’t you pretend that mathematical
objects exist autonomously, like all other mathematicians do, and use classical logic?
Imagine telling an intuitionist: you might have not noticed this, but your classical
colleagues do not really believe that mathematical objects exist, they only pretend that
they do. As far as I am aware, neither the intuitionist nor the classical mathematician
decide to pretend or know that they have to pretend.
I don’t know what it would mean, in the case of mathematics, to stop pretending
and fall prey to the literal interpretation of mathematical discourse (which, for ordinary
fiction, leads us towards psychopathology). Would someone start attributing real
properties to mathematical objects? Would the Monster Group be really frightening? We
never have to tell our children “well, you know, we are sorry, we never told you this, but
in fact, numbers do not really exist”, whereas those of us who have decided to do as if
Santa Claus existed had to have a conversation or at least make a verification at some
point that our children have picked up on reality. Some children are really disappointed
to learn that Santa Claus does not exist. It is an interesting thought experiment to imagine
a child crying after learning that numbers do not really exist. In fact, no one has ever
feigned that numbers really exist! What would that mean12?
Thus, at the very least, Bunge has to tell us how pretense works in the case of
mathematical objects and how it differs from how pretense works in the case of ordinary
fictions. If we are to explain the behavior of mathematicians by saying that they pretend
that mathematical constructs exist by themselves, we have to be able to say how this
pretense comes about, how it works and why it is the best explanation for that
behavior.As far as I know, Bungenever went further than to suggest that one could
explain this behavior that way. Perhaps one can. Perhaps there is a simpler explanation,
12 That seems to be an easy exercise in Bunge’s framework. If we were to feign that mathematical
objects reallyexisted, then it means that mathematical objects could be in various states. What
exactly these states would be, that would have to be determined. Would they be more like
physical objects or living organisms? It is up to your imagination to decide.I suspect that in some
cases, the ‘reality’ would be expressed more in terms of an independence from the mind, the will
of the subject, in contrast with the objects that we create. But this shows, once again, that if we
pretend that mathematical objects really exist, we do it in a very selective fashion without having
learned anything about it.
and still within a materialist framework. We have to go back to the notion of dependent
existence.
7. Abstract Artifacts and Varieties of Dependent Existence
To understand the various types of dependent existence, let us stick with fictions and
literary works a little further. Amie Thomasson has developed an interesting theory of
dependent existence that she has applied to clarify the ontological status of fictional
characters and fictional works, among other things13. (See Thomasson 1999.)
According to Thomasson, the existence of a fictional character depends on (1) the
creative act of a (really) existing author or authors and (2) on the existence of a literary
work. In turn, the existence of a literary work depends on the acts of its creator or
creators, but it also depends on some copy or memory of it and a (really) existing
competent reader.Thus, the structure of dependence of a fictional character is a complex
network of real existents, acts and intentions. In Thomasson’s words, fictional characters
“should be entities that depend on the creative acts of authors to bring them into existence
and on some concrete individuals such as copies of texts and a capable audience in order
to remain in existence.” (Thomasson 1999, p.12)
There are subtle points that we need not go into for our purposes14. The following
remarks will suffice. According to this analysis, fictional characters have a history: they
are born in certain historical, cultural and social contexts and by the act of a real human
or a group of humans. In the case of literary fictions, there are writings or oral traditions,
more generally literary works, in which the character first appear. It is important to
notice, however, that for the character to be, that particular object, the original literary
work, does not have to survive. Any copy or any faithful memory of it will do and will
allow for the fictional character to exist. There is thus a certain independence from
particular and specific real objects for them to exist and continue to exist. We all
recognize that they can survive their creator and even the original book or work by which
they were introduced. It is obvious that, according to Thomasson, fictional existence does
not amount to the capacity of a human to conceive a fictional character. There has to be a
creator (or creators) who not only creates the character, but does so by doing, building
something, namely what we call a literary work. For the latter to be possible, one has to
have a language and, in most cases, a written language (although one can argue that the
latter is not necessary, as the various oral traditions clearly indicate), together with
specific cognitive capacities, for instance a powerful enough memory (where, in most
cases, one will find mnemonic tricks to help remember the stories) or the capacity to read
a certain language and the latter has to be possessed by other humans afterwards. There
is, clearly, an intrinsic social component at work in this picture, since the existence
13 Thomasson seems to have move away from the specifics of her earlier theory. I stick to it
simply because it provides an ontological analysis of fictions as dependent entities, thus an
analysis that is close to Bunge’s claims. I am not claiming that it is the most adequate analysis. In
fact, I would be inclined to address these issues more in the spirit of Thomasson’s recent work.
That is another matter.
14 Thomasson offers an interesting and rich classification of artefacts based on certain properties
of the dependence relation. We refer the reader to her book for more.
depends on more than one human and even some cultural elements, which goes hand in
hand with (neuro)biological capacities15.
This takes care of most of our intuitions about the existence of fictional
characters. Thomasson introduces a more general framework to treat the different kinds
of ontological dependence. It is worth looking at the dependence relations that she uses.
Thomasson’s ontological categories
In her theory, Thomasson offers an explication oftypes of ontological dependence by
combining four notions of dependence: rigid dependence, generic dependence, constant
dependence and historical dependence. Thomasson introduces the distinction between
constant dependence and historical dependence as follows:
We can begin by distinguishing constant dependence, a relation such that one
entity requires that the other entity exist at every time at which it exists, from
historical dependence or dependence for coming into existence, a relation such
that one entity requires that the other entity exist at some time prior to or
coincident with every time at which it exists. There are not all of the different
possible cases of dependence but merely describe some of the most interesting
and general cases of dependence. (Thomasson 1999, p.29)
Clearly, historical dependence is weaker than constant dependence. In other words, if x is
constantly dependent on y, then x is also historically dependent on y. As we have already
indicated, fictional characters historically depend on a creator or a group of creators to be,
but they do not constantly depend on that creator. Examples of constant dependence are
numerous. If consciousness is an emergent property of brains, then my consciousness is
constantly dependent on my brain.
When the relation of historical dependence rests on a particular individual or a
particular group of individuals, Thomasson qualifies this relation as being rigid. This
qualification can be applied both for the constant case and the historical case. For
example, I am rigidly historically dependent on my parents and La Bohème is rigidly
historically dependent on Puccini’s existence. My consciousness is rigidly constantly
dependent on my brain. There are relations of dependence that are not rigid, but rather
generic. In this case, the relation does not depend on a particular, singular individual, the
latter being understood in a broad sense. To use Thomasson’s example, “a given sample
of alcohol is rigidly historically dependent on the sugar from which it is formed, it is
merely generically historically dependent on some yeast (or other appropriate catalyst).”
(Thomasson 1999, p.33) An example of a generic constant dependence is provided by the
existence of a University. At any moment that the Université de Montréal exists, there
must be persons who work at this particular institution, people who teaches, do research
15Otavio Bueno has sketched a form of mathematical fictionalism based on Thomasson’s views
that is strikingly close to Bunge’s. Bueno defends the idea that mathematical entities are like
fictional characters since, according to him, they are created in a particular context and in a
particular time and their existence depends upon the existence of written papers and competent
readers. He even adopts an existence predicate and distinguishes it from the existential quantifier.
However, in the end, his position differs both from Bunge’s position and from Thomasson’s. We
cannot do it justice in such a short paper. See Bueno 2009.
and other people that are registered as students, who attend classes, go to the library, etc.
Of course, there is no particular person whom the University’s continued existence
requires.
Notice that Thomasson is well aware that there may be other cases of dependence
and she does not claim to cover all possible cases16. The strongest relation of dependence
is the category of rigid constant dependence (RCD). It entails all the others. Thus, it
entails the categories of rigid historical dependence (RHD) and rigid dependence (RD).
This can be pictured thus: → → . In turn, rigid constant dependence
entails generic constant dependence (GCD). There is an obvious line of entailments
between the generic dependences: the generic constant dependence (GCD) entails the
generic historic dependence (GHD) which, in turn, entails the generic dependence (GD).
Hence, the complete picture looks like this:
↓ →→ ↓ →→ ↓
Table 1 Dependence Relations
We are not done. We have introduced the relations of dependence in general. We
now specify two types of dependence that are ontologically fundamental for our
purposes: the dependence on material or spatiotemporal entities and the dependence on
mental states17. Each type of dependence yields a two-dimensional grid of 10 categories
each therefore the whole space of ontological categories is four-dimensional with 100
possible categories. There is no need to present the whole system here. We refer the
reader to Thomasson’s book. (Thomasson 1999, chap. 8.)
In a materialist framework, material entities are not dependent on mental states,
neither rigidly nor generically. Mathematical realists or Platonists would probably claim
that mathematical objects, although not material, neither depend on material entities nor
do they depend on mental states. Thus, both material and mathematical objects would
belong to the category of objects that are neither rigidly dependent nor generically
16 Thomasson argues that the relations of dependence, constant dependence and historical
dependence are all reflexive and transitive. This suggests that the resulting ontology could be
formalized using the mathematical theory of categories, by representing the relation of
dependence by a morphism between objects. The links between the kinds of dependence can be
represented by functors. In fact, the distinction between rigid dependence and generic dependence
can also be captured via a specific type of adjunction. This is not surprising given the fact that
mathematical functions capture a form of dependence. We even talk about dependent and
independent variables. We leave this project for another paper.
17We will stick to the terminology of mental states instead of brain states, despite the fact that we
are in a materialist ontology. The reason for this choice is that the term ‘mental states’ already
suggests a certain independence from particular brains but still indicates a clear and well-
understood realm of discourse. Of course, the question as to how mental states depend on brain
states is fundamental and, at some point, we might be ready to talk about brain states. See, for
instance, Piazza & Izard 2009. By saying that constructs are equivalence classes of brain states,
Bunge himself introduces a different identity criterion for mental states than for brain states, thus
introducing the possibility of treating them as a genuine category.
dependent on mental states18. We are interested in the case where mathematical objects
depend on mental states and on material entities, for this seems to be consistent with
Bunge’s claims. Where should they be in this framework?
One of the fascinating aspects of Thomasson’s categories is that it opens the door
to a multiplicity of ontological categories between the concrete and the abstract, a
distinction that is usually considered to be a dichotomy. Of course, the latter depends on
how these two terms are interpreted. Thomasson puts the distinction squarely within the
space of material dependence. It seems reasonable to claim that concrete objects rigidly
constantly depend on themselves. What about abstract objects or entities more generally?
An obvious possibility in the present framework is to interpret the property of being
abstract as being historically independent from material entities, which leaves open the
possibility of being generically and/or rigidly dependent on material entities.
Thomasson herself proposes to take the weakest definition allowed by her system,
namely that an entity is abstract if it is not rigidly constantly dependent on material
(spatiotemporal) entities. This still leaves three possibilities: abstract entities can be
rigidly historically dependent on material entities, rigidly dependent on material entities
or, finally, not rigidly dependent on material entities. In the latter case, being abstract is
not one single category. There are now various kinds of abstract entities. Nonetheless, if
we accept the foregoing characterizations of concrete and abstract objects, we get back
the familiar ‘abstract/concrete’ dichotomy.
On the one hand, fictional characters depend rigidly historically on mental states,
since they rigidly depend on historical actors for their creation. They also belong to the
category of generic constantly dependent entities, since after their creation, their
existence depends on the mental states of agents that are capable of understanding the
works in which they appear. This takes care of the dependence on mental entities. On the
other hand, fictional characters are part of literary works. As such, they constantly depend
on some material entities, i.e. copies of the work, and also rigidly depend historically on
certain material entities to bring them into existence, i.e. the particular author who wrote
the work at a particular time in a particular sociocultural context. Thus, the literary work
of art itself, and the fictional characters it talks about have no spatiotemporal properties,
but the work was created at a specific moment by a specific individual (or individuals). It
is therefore an abstract object that nonetheless has a dependent existence and the
dependence is both mental and material.
Thomasson mentions another case of abstract entity worth comparing with
fictions and that will be useful for our own purposes: technological artifacts, like the
telephone, the computer, etc. In these cases, it is not one specific object that we refer to,
but a type of object with a specific function. In many cases, the type has many different
material instantiations. Their existence is generically historically dependent on mental
states, for they did not exist before a certain time, they had to be invented, but their
coming into being does not depend on one unique and specific individual. The telephone
18 Thomasson herself distinguishes two opposites: the mental-material and the real-ideal. The first
one would be reflected in the space of mental dependence, the material being independent of
anything mental, and the second one would be placed in the space of spatiotemporal dependence,
the ideal – which, from a Platonic point of view, would include numbers and similar entities –
being independent of anything real. Notice that the material and the ideal are thus characterized
purely negatively. (Thomasson 1999, p.125)
was invented independently by many different people and so was the computer. There
has to be someone to do it, but it does not have to be that particular person. Similarly, one
could argue, as Thomasson does, that they generically constantly depend on material
entities. If we were to lose all known exemplars of eight-tracks cassettes and machines,
together with their plans and designs, then this technological artifact would cease to exist.
8. Mathematical Constructs as Abstract Artifacts
What about mathematical objects, or to borrow Bunge’s terminology, mathematical
constructs? They are undoubtedly abstract in any sense of that word and, thus, in
particular in the sense proposed by Thomasson: they lack a spatiotemporal location or, in
her terminology, they are not rigidly constantly dependent on any material entity. We can
be more precise.
Let me immediately state in Thomasson’s terminology what seems to be one of
the claims repeatedly made by Bunge: mathematics is at the very least generically
constantly dependent on mental entities. Although it does not depend on one particular
mathematician for its existence, Bunge claims that mathematics requires the existence of
some person capable of understanding it to continue to exist. Note that it is, in principle,
absolutely impossible to verify this claim.
Is it generically constantly dependent on material entities? I claim that it is.
Mathematics needs to be told, written, drawn, etc. It has always been accompanied by
physical embodiments, tools (stones, wooden marks, compass, ruler, abacus, calculators
and, nowadays, computers), symbolic system and notational devices of all kinds. Of
course, it does not depend on one particular such material entity, but it does depend
socially and culturally on the presence of symbolic representation in one form or another.
Thus, if humanity were to disappear and all writings, marks, concrete models and
mathematical tools were to disappear with it, mathematics would cease to be. Note once
again, that it is, in principle, absolutely impossible to verify this claim.
I claim that there is an important difference with the case of technological artifacts
described in the preceding section and it has to do with the role or the kind of dependence
at play between the material entities involved in mathematics. The material objects
embodying technological artifacts are real, genuine exemplars of these artifacts. A real,
concrete and functioning turntable is just a turntable: it is a real token of the type. What I
hold in my hand is a screwdriver. It was invented, build just to do what it does. It is a real
token of the type. A drawn triangle is not a triangle, a constructed wooden dodecahedron
is not a dodecahedron. The symbol ‘’ is not the number . No symbol, no sequence of
digits, even thought of as a type, can be the number , since the latter is irrational and
transcendental. A written proof of a theorem is not the proof. The latter is an abstract
object. There are no real token of mathematical types.
It is of course because of these facts that mathematical objects are traditionally
considered to be ideal objects. Their dependence on material entities is of a different
nature. We move away from technological artifacts and we move back to fictions. Most
of mathematics is written and presents itself as a text. It can also be told, usually next to a
blackboard or a piece of paper, thus with some written marks. Some mathematical texts
are more akin to musical partitions in the sense that the notation tells you how to do
things: it has to be performed, in the case of music, on an instrument, in the case of
mathematics, in one’s head or on a piece of paper. But one does not read a mathematical
text like one reads a short story or a musical partition. When reading a mathematical
paper, one usually needs a pen and a piece of paper and writes as she reads. While
someone can take notes while reading a short story for various reasons, it is rarely in
order to understand the story that someone would do it.
This brings us to the question of the rigid historical dependence of mathematics
on humans and here we touch upon an important difference with fictions. Many
mathematical theorems, proofs, constructions, theories, algorithms, etc.are identified by
the name of the mathematician or mathematicians that introduced them: Gauss
fundamental theorem of algebra, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, Wiles proof of the
Shimura-Weil-Taniyama conjecture and, as a consequence, of Fermat’s last ‘theorem’,
Hamilton’s quaternions, the Hopffibration, Grothen diecktoposes, Buchberger’s
algorithm, etc. It would be very easy to extend the list almost indefinitely. Still, although
for sociological reasons the correct attribution of these items to their creators is
important, they are nonetheless often thought as being ultimately independent of their
creators, in contrast with, say, Offred in Margaret Atwood’s novel The Handmaid’s Tale.
I submit that this behavior, to go back to Bunge’s terminology, is attributable to
fundamental aspects of mathematical knowledge. First, a concept is sometimes
introduced independently and differently by different mathematicians. These various
presentations of the concept are then shown to be ‘the same’, in an appropriate sense of
the latter term. One standard example of that phenomenon is the notion of computable
functions. This shows that, in some cases at least, the notion of dependence is generic
instead of being rigid.
Second, as already observed by Robert Thomas, a mathematical paper does not
describe a series of events that happen in some possible space. It is not a narrative in the
usual sense of that word. (See Thomas 2000 and 2002.) Writing a mathematical paper is
not like writing a fiction. The language of mathematics is such that it is possible for a
mathematician to write a paper and erase any trace of a narrator or any reference to
mental or material entities. Reading a mathematical paper is not like reading a fiction. In
a sense, reading a mathematical paper is comparable to reading a blueprint: it guides you
through concepts, examples, constructions, statements, proofs, computations, etc. via
certain conventional signs and notational systems. Any competent mathematician who
masters the concepts and the language used in a paper or a conference reconstructs n her
mind the conceptual system that is presented. The particular way of describing that
conceptual system does not matter (although the particular language might). Once it is
understood and mastered, the mathematical content is in some sense entirely assimilated
by the reader. It is from then on his or hers. Completely. There is nothing that seems
idiosyncratic to the author, there is nothing that escapes the reader. What is more, the
content can be completely represented in a different manner, even rewritten in a different
language or framework. It can be extended by following its necessary logical
conclusions. It can also be enriched, transformed, generalized, abstracted, applied, etc.
Although a different writer can very well extend a given work, as we have convincingly
seen in the latest extensions of Larsson’s Millenium series by Lagercrantz, the new writer
still has to adopt a style, characters, a history, conventions, etc. to go on and, as the
example shows clearly, Lagercrantz’s remarkable achievement cannot be presented as the
logical and necessary extension of Larsson’s work, nor can it be said that he has
generalized it, or abstracted from it, or applied it, or expressed it by using different
concepts.
Third, the natural numbers and elementary geometry have a special
epistemological status which contribute to the conviction that mathematical objects have
a distinctive ontological status. According to recent research in cognitive science, innate,
non-linguistic, and universal cognitive capacities underlie the development of the natural
number concept and of elementary geometry. (See, for instance, Dehaene et. al. 2011,
Dillon et. al. 2013.) The fact that these capacities are innate, universal and non-linguistic
and that they serve as the cognitive bedrock for numbers and geometry certainly fuels the
belief that what we are referring to in these cases is independent of mental entities or
capacities. They are just given. Of course, this reinforces the idea that mathematics is not
rigidly and historically dependent on mental entities. However, these findings certainly
do not allow us to conclude that number theory and geometry as a theory are innate, non-
linguistic and universal. That is where the dependences kick in and that we start
attributing the creation of concepts, conjectures, proofs, calculations, algorithms to
particular mathematicians.
These reasons explain why, at the end of the day, mathematicians refrain from
claiming that mathematics is rigidly historically dependent on mental entities and even
generically constantly dependent on mental entities. The case against a constantly historic
dependence on material entities seems too easy to mention.
If I am correct, it is wrong to say that mathematical objects are fictions. In fact,
even ontologically, there are substantial differences between the two. Thus, pace Bunge,
mathematical objects are not on an ontological par with fictional characters. That could
be received as the bad news. The good news is that we do not need to talk about fictions
nor do we need to talk about mathematical objects in any deep ontological sense.
9. Structuralism and Mathematical Objects
As it is clear from the definition given in section 5 above, that Bunge tries to combine
two different relations of dependence when he deals with mathematics. On the one hand,
he clearly believes that constructs in general depend on brain states and therefore
mathematical constructs in particular depend on brain states. This relation of dependence
leads him to the claim that mathematical objects are ficta. On the other hand,
mathematical constructs depend on other concepts in a singular way. There is a
conceptual dependence between mathematical concepts whose nature is unique to
mathematics19. When Bunge moves to this type of dependence, he switch to
mathematical concepts as being conceptual systems or part of conceptual systems. This
dualism is in fact inevitable if one wants to develop a form of structuralism within a
materialist framework. The challenges consist in identifying the correct relations of
dependence in both cases and how they should be articulated together into a coherent
whole. I claim that the correct foundational or metamathematical stance is indeed a form
of structuralism. This takes care of the conceptual dependence.
As to the dependence on mental/brain states, if one looks carefully at the remarks
I have made in the previous section, then it should be clear that 1) there are some
19The reader might want to include logic here. That is another issue. For a long time, this
conviction was captured by the claim that mathematics is analytic.
existence claims made concerning the ontological status of mathematical objects that go
beyond what we can, even in principle, verify and, therefore, I suggest that we simply
discard the underlying questions as being pseudo questions and 2) what can be said, over
and above the internal existential questions settled by mathematicians themselves, can be
taken care of by investigating mathematical practice and the human and social sciences,
in particular the cognitive sciences, but not only them. Needless to say, I will only make
sketchy remarks in this section.
Mathematical structuralism is the claim that mathematics is about structures. This
thesis can be spelled out completely, through a metamathematical analysis of the notion
of structure. Such an analysis was provided by Bourbaki already in the 1950s in a set-
theoretical framework, although it was dismissed by most logicians, philosophers and
historians of mathematics for various reasons20. A more recent and improved version was
presented by the logician Michael Makkai ( Makkai 1998.) It is not necessary to present
the technical details to understand the basic ideas underlying this form of structuralism.
The fundamental idea is straightforward. For a mathematical theory to be a
structuralist theory, it should be possible to prove that the following claim is a meta-
theorem: given any property P in the given language ℒ of the theory T, for all objects ,
of the theory, if ( ) and ≅ , then ( ). In words, a theory is a structuralist theory if
the provable properties of the theory are only those that are invariant under the proper
notion of isomorphism. This says precisely that mathematics is about the properties and
relations expressed in the proper language and that the underlying objects merely fill in
the places to be filled in the relations of the theory. The specific nature of the objects is
totally irrelevant. It is in this sense that mathematical objects are not the central concern
and that they are always part of a system21.
10. Conclusion
It is ironic, in the present context, that the appropriate language for structuralism is a
logic with dependent sorts (or types). This dependence reproduces the fact that a structure
depends, for its existence, on previously given objects or systems. We are here dealing
with a form of conceptual dependence. The appropriate language reflects a clear
ontological hierarchy.
Structures themselves are given by a formula in a languageℒ. They are then
interpreted in a system in which the notion of isomorphism plays the key role. Makkai’s
system covers set-theoretical structures, categorical structures, bicategorical structures,
…, n-categorical structures, up to -categorical structures. Whether one has to go on is
an open problem. How the foundational framework has to be develop and what will exist
within it has to be settled by mathematicians and logicians. A philosopher must take note
and see what follows. But it is first and foremost an internal affair to logic and
mathematics.
20 One interesting exception is Erhard Scheibe who, in his tribute to Bunge in 1981, presents an
analysis of invariance and covariance of physical theories based on Bourbaki’s analysis. See
Scheibe 1981.
21 Makkai has developed a structuralist set theory using his framework. We refer the reader to his
paper for details. See Makkai 2013 for the technical presentation, and Marquis 2012, Marquis
2018, for more on the philosophical ideas involved in the project.
How about the dependences of mathematical structures on mental/brain states and
material entities? As I have already indicated, claims that mathematical structures
originate with humans and that they would cease to exist if the latter were to disappear
with the material production that comes with it are unverifiable. These claims are
intuitively plausible for fictions and technological artifacts. They might be true, they
might be false for mathematical structures. There is no way to know and it seems that
there are just as many people who believe that they are false than they are true. We
submit that it does not matter and that we do not have and cannot have the philosophical
tools to settle the issue. They are, of course, consequences of a materialist ontology and,
as such, have to be acknowledged. Furthermore, ontological issues pertaining to abstract
objects have concrete consequences. What can be settled are the types of dependence of
mathematics on mental/brain states and material objects in its history, as it is practiced, as
it is taught. Questions pertaining to these dependences can and should be investigated.
The answers make a difference to real issues. This should not be a surprise to Bunge’s
readers: he has been calling attention to the real impact of ontological decisions all along.
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